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A SHIFTING BARRIER? DIFFICULTIES OBTAINING
PATENT INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES IN JAPAN
Scott K. Dinwiddie
Abstract. American economic interests previously have criticized the Japanese patent
system as a trade barrier. Recent agreements between the United States and Japan should help
reduce the difficulties Americans have had obtaining patents in Japan. However, Americans
who acquire Japanese patents are likely to be disappointed and discouraged by the formal
protection afforded their new property. The patent enforcement system in Japan provides
limited judicial remedies. Equitable relief is difficult to enforce. The full value of monetary
damages is extremely difficult to prove, and the possibility for equitable recovery of damages
in excess of those proved does not exist. The cost of undertaking litigation and the
unavailability of attorneys' fees provide further disincentives to seeking judicial enforcement
of patent rights. Thus, although Americans may find it easier to obtain a patent in Japan, they
are likely to become frustrated with the enforcement system, leading to increased complaints
about the Japanese patent system from U.S. commercial interests.
For years, U.S. manufacturers have complained that administrative
barriers and delays in the Japanese patent system have allowed Japanese
manufacturers to profit by exploiting foreign technology.' To date, much
effort has focused on the access problem-the difficulties Americans2
face in trying to obtain a Japanese patent.3 Lengthy delays have been a
particular problem, evidenced by the nearly thirty years it took Texas
Instruments to obtain its Japanese semi-conductor patent.4 Recently,
1. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Intellectual Property Rights: U.S. Companies Patent
Experiences in Japan (1993), reprinted in Japanese Intellectual Property: The Japanese Patent
System and Strategies for Competitiveness 165 (Japan Info. Access Project ed., 1993) [hereinafter
GAO Report]; Charles R.B. Macedo, Note: First-To-File: Is American Adoption of the International
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 543, 583 (noting that "in the
television and computer areas... foreign companies, especially Japanese ones, have grabbed large
market shares from Americans by free riding on American technology"); The Effect of the Japanese
Patent System on American Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 24,
1988) (recording witnesses' accusations that Japanese patent law in practice presents a non-tariff
barrier).
2. Although the term "Americans" can refer to residents of both American continents, it is used
here to refer only to citizens of the United States.
3. See Nancy J. Linck & John E. McGarry, Patent Procurement and Enforcement in Japan-A
Trade Barrier, 27 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 411 (1993-1994) (summarizing the present
situation and noting that the currently proposed reforms will do little to solve the enforcement
problems).
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however, there have been signs that improved access to the Japanese
patent system for U.S. interests is on the horizon. Two recent agreements
between the United States and Japan concerning patent harmonization
should help ease the application process for Americans.!
Unfortunately, an improved application process is unlikely to be a
panacea for Americans interested in protecting technology in Japan.
Patent application reforms, though helpful, address only one side of
patent protection: the granting of patent rights. The other side of patent
protection, the remedies available for infringement of patent rights,
remains largely unaltered by the recent agreements.6
4. Texas Instruments (TI applied for a Japanese patent for the integrated circuit on February 6,
1960. The Japanese Patent Office finally issued the relevant patent in October 1989. Thomas C.
Hayes, Japan Grip Still Seen on Patents, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1989, at DI. The comparable U.S.
patent was granted in 1964. Japan Finally Gives U.S. Firm Chip Patent, S.F Chron., Nov. 22, 1989,
at Al.
Initial predictions were that TI's Japanese patent would be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in
royalty revenue until expiration in November 2001. Japan Finally Gives U.S. Firm Chip Patent, S.F.
Chron., Nov. 22, 1989, at Al. However, a recent decision by the Tokyo High Court may severely
curtail the value of TI's semi-conductor patent. In its decision the Tokyo High Court ruled that
Fujitsu, which manufactured computers using integrated circuits, did not violate TI's Japanese patent
because current technology does not resemble that covered by the patent. See Masato Ishizawa,
Ruling Against TI Patent May Embolden Firms, Nikkei Weekly, Sept. 5, 1994, at 1. The case is
currently on appeal. Chip Maker Appeals Loss in Fujitsu Patent Lawsuit, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1994,
at B7. For additional discussion of the TI patent, see John C. Lindgren & Craig J. Yudell, Protecting
American Intellectual Property in Japan, 10 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1994).
Another example of a long delay is the almost 12 years it took Allied Signal to obtain a Japanese
patent on an amorphous metal product. US.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 5,
1990).
5. The first agreement, signed on January 20, 1994, ensures that "[b]y July 1, 1995, the Japanese
Patent Office (JPO) will permit foreign nationals to file patent applications in the English language,
with a translation into Japanese to follow within two months." Japan-United States: Mutual
Understanding on Patents, 33 I.L.M. 313 (1994). Because Japan emplo3s a first-to-file system,
rather than the U.S. first-to-invent system, the ability to file initially in English can be extremely
important in trying to secure patent rights. See Tokkyoh? [Patent Law (Pat L.)] § 39, translated in
Japanese Laws Relating to Industrial Property (Japanese Patent Office trans, 1992).
The second agreement, signed on August 16, 1994, is designed to speed the time in which a
Japanese patent is issued. This agreement forced Japan to end its pmctire by April 1, 1995 of
allowing third parties to oppose a competitor's patent before it is g-anted and will ensure
introduction by January 1996 of an accelerated Japanese patent examinaion procedure allowing
applicants to obtain a decision within 36 months if requested. Intellectual Property: U.S., Japan Sign
Agreement to Speed Up Patent Process, BNA Int'l Trade Daily, Aug. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, U.S. News File.
6. See Linck & McGarry, supra note 3, at 43 1.
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New American entrants to Japan's patent system are likely to find the
available legal remedies less than satisfactory.7 Legal enforcement in a
patent infringement action in Japan generally is harder to obtain than in
the United States and usually is significantly less remunerative. Some of
these differences are due to variations in the patent laws of the two
countries, and others result from differences between a common law and
a civil law system.' The result, however, is that U.S. owners of Japanese
patents may be unprepared to adequately protect and leverage their
newly acquired property in the Japanese marketplace. Therefore, patent
enforcement is likely to receive increasing scrutiny and become a focus
of trade friction between the United States and Japan.
This Comment discusses patent enforcement remedies available in
Japan and analyzes how they generally are weaker than those available in
the United States. Part I briefly explains the historical reasons why
Japanese judges possess less enforcement authority than their U.S.
counterparts and why this result leads to a plaintiff's heavy reliance on
monetary damages as a form of relief for patent infringement. Part I
concludes with a discussion of why the large role of conciliation in Japan
does not decrease the importance of monetary damages in the
enforcement system. Part II examines some of the major procedural
barriers in Japan that make it extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prove
the amount of damages caused by an infringer's actions. Part III
discusses particular obstacles to proving causation of damages and the
likelihood that full compensation for patent infringement will be
unavailable in Japan. Part IV describes additional barriers to seeking
judicial resolution of infringement in Japan. Finally, part V considers
patent protection in a system with limited judicial remedies.
7. The fact that Americans are likely to find the Japanese enforcement system unsatisfactory does
not mean the system does not work. Rather, the system works in a way that is likely to disadvantage
parties who rely on judicial intervention to enforce their patent rights. The fact that the Japanese
patent enforcement system is alien to Americans is likely to lead to increased criticism from
American economic interests, even if the system is effective from the Japanese perspective. For an
argument that essentially concludes "when in Rome do as the Romans do" to effectively protect
intellectual property rights, see Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 31-32. For further discussion
concerning extra-judicial enforcement methods in Japan, see infra part V.
8. Some of these differences are due also to the unique nature of Japan's own civil law system.
See 4 Law and the Legal Process in Japan: Materials for an Introductory Course on Japanese Law
110 (John Owen Haley et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Haley et al.] (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Asian Law Program, University of Washington) ("The remedial and enforcement powers of
the courts in Japan are considerably weaker than those in common law and most other civil law
jurisdictions.") (emphasis added).
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ENFORCEMENT IN JAPAN
A. Remedies and the Lack of Equity Powers in Japan
Jurisprudence in the United States commonly is divided into two
branches: substantive rights and judicial remedies.9 Remedies are the
relief provided for the violation of a given substantive right."0
Historically the Anglo-American legal system divided judicial remedies
into two types: legal and equitable. 1 Legal remedies were available in
the courts of law.'2 Equitable remedies were available in the courts of
equity, which possessed the power to create remedies other than those
expressly provided for in the courts of law. 3 These two forms of action
were later combined into one in the United States. 4 Thus, today most
U.S. courts can apply statutory remedies and also may step outside a
given statute to exercise equitable powers.
Having developed out of a distinct legal tradition,' Japanese courts
are invested with powers different from those commonly found in the
Anglo-American system. Adopting a system based on the civil law
traditions of France and Germany, Japan provided its courts with legal,
but not equitable, powers. 6 Thus, modem Japanese courts possess little
authority to fashion relief not expressly provided for by statute. 7 Related
to this lack of equity power is a nearly complete lack of contempt
power.' Without the power of contempt, Japanese judges have little
9. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution § 1.1 (2d ed. 1993). Cf
U.C.C. § 1-201(34) (1990) ("'Remedy' means any remedial right to which, an aggrieved party is
entitled with or without resort to a tribunal.").
10. Dobbs, supra note 9, § 1.1.
11. For a general history of equitable remedies in the common law system, see id. §§ 2.1-2.3.
12. Id.§ 2.1.
13. Id.
14. Most states combined these two forms of action into one (the civil action) during procedural
reforms adopted in the mid-nineteenth century. Fleming James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure § 1.7 (4th
ed. 1992). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain similar provisions for merger. Dobbs, supra
note 9, § 2.6(1), at 101 & n.2; Fed. 1. Civ. P. 2.
15. See Yosiyuki Noda, Introduction to Japanese Law 5-6 (Anthony B. Angelo ed. & trans.,
1976).
16. See id. at 49-54.
17. Id.
18. The weak nature of Japanese contempt powers is unique even among civil law countries. See
John Owen Haley, Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox 118 (1991).
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authority to enforce compliance with court orders. 9 Although statutory
fines exist in certain circumstances for failure to comply with a judicial
order," they are generally minimal,21 infrequently used,' and hardly
comparable to the wide spectrum of sanctioning measures available to a
U.S. judge under the contempt power.' Without these equitable or
contempt powers, a Japanese judge possesses considerably less authority
than his or her U.S. counterpart to provide a remedy for the breach of a
legal right.
This difference in enforcement authority is particularly notable in a
Japanese judge's limited ability to grant prospective or on-going relief.24
Once a final judgment has been rendered, Japanese judges do not retain
jurisdiction over a case.' Without the ability to monitor compliance over
time, the Japanese judiciary possesses only limited means to ensure
compliance with on-going relief, severely curtailing the effectiveness of
one standard infringement remedy: the permanent injunction.26 This
limited effectiveness acts as a major limitation on the Japanese patent
19. Id
20. For example, fines exist for failure to comply with an order for discovery, Code of Civil
Procedure [C. Civ. P.] art. 318 (Japan), translated in 2 EHS Law Bulletin Series (Eibun-Horei-Sha
[Codes Translation Institute] ed., 1992), or for maldng a fhlse statement under oath. Id. art. 269.
21. The current maximum fine for failure to comply with a discovery request or for making a false
statement under oath is approximately $1,000 (100,000 yen). C. Civ. P. arts. 318, 269 (Japan)
(discovery and false statement). The comparable sanction in U.S. federal court for a discovery
violation is ultimately contempt of court. Fed. K. Civ. P. 37(b). An individual in contempt of a U.S.
court's authority may be punished by a fine or imprisonment, at the court's discretion. 18 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1988). For additional discussion on the limited nature of discovery in Japan, see infra text
accompanying notes 37-47.
22. Kji Harada, Civil Discovery Under Japanese Law, 16 Law in Japan 21, 38 (1983) (stating
that "in Japan, to the extent they exist at all, sanctions [to secure discovery] are weak and seldom
used!).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
24. Haley et al., supra note 8, at 110.
25. Id.
26. In addition to the enforcement problem, or perhaps due to it, permanent injunctions rarely are
granted for patent infringement in Japan. See Samson Helfgott, Effectively Working with the
Japanese Patent System, in Japanese Intellectual Property: The Japanese Patent System and
Strategies for Competitiveness, 67, 69 (Japan Info. Access Project ed., 1993). In addition, permanent
injunctions are not effected until all appeals have been resolved. Mark F. Wachter, Patent
Enforcement in Japan: An American Perspective for Success, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 59, 67-68 (1991). This
delay can be significant because the average length of time to conclude an infringement action in
Japan is three to nine years. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 64. In the United States, the comparable
length of time is two to three years. Id.
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enforcement system.2 In an area that relies on two types of remedies-
monetary damages and injunction 2 -- the difficulty of obtaining a
permanent injunction necessarily forces greater reliance on monetary
damages as a form of judicial relief for infringerrent.29 Thus, the
possibility of obtaining monetary damages takes on increased importance
for a plaintiff seeking a judicial remedy for patent infringement in Japan.
B. Caveat: The Role of Conciliation
The fact that Japanese courts lack the power to effectively monitor
ongoing transactions does not mean that Japanese courts are ineffective
at resolving conflicts. While the U.S. model of conflict resolution
frequently relies on pursuing a legal claim to the point of final judgment,
the Japanese model depends largely on the role of "conciliation" and
settlement. 0 Japan's heavy reliance on conciliation may be viewed as a
27. However, the Japanese judiciary more readily issues preliminary injunctions (kari-shobun),
making the preliminary injunction a useful and popular form of action in Japan. See Haley, supra
note 18, at 118-19 (providing statistics on th, number of civil actions in Japan for 1975-1985). In
patent infringement cases preliminary injunctions have been difficult to obtain, and thus generally
have not been useful, particularly for U.S. firms. See GAO Report, supra noto 1, at 65-66; Helfgott,
supra note 26, at 69 (stating that "there is almost no opportunity to obtain a preliminary injunction
[in Japan]'); Wachter, supra note 26, at 81. However, if a patentee's case is sirong, can be presented
clearly, and involves only settled issues of law, a preliminary injunction can b(. obtained in Japan. Id.
at 68 & n.28, 81-84 (discussing preliminary injunction in Japan and noting Monsanto's ability to
obtain a preliminary injunction against Stauffer in a "record" nine months).
28. See 5 Donald S. Chisum, Patents: A Treatise on the Law of Pateatability, Validity and
Infringement § 20.01 (1994). Broadly speaking, in the patent area monetary dunages compensate for
past harm, while injunction protects against future harm. Id.
29. See Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 29 (stating that "[the primary remedy available to a
prevailing plaintiff [in a patent infringement action in Japan] is damages"). However, for reasons
discussed below, damages are awarded infrequently. See infra part LB.; see also James A. Forstner,
Patent Litigation in Japan, China and Korea, in Global Intellectual Property Series 1993:
Successful Multi-Country Patent Litigation Strategies 13, 14 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 366, 1993).
30. Conciliation has been defined as "a settlement of a dispute by means of compromise reached
through the intervention of a third party that promotes negotiation and agreement between the
disputing parties." Takayuki Yamashita, Conciliation, in 7 Doing Business in Japan pt. 14, § 3.01[1]
(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1994). Conciliation includes court mediation or "in-court compromise"
(soshojo no wakaO, where the third party is the court, as well as "conciliation"
(ch'teO, where the third party is a conciliation committee comprising a judge and two lay members.
Tetsuya Obuchi, Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute Resolution in Japan:
Traditional and Modern Aspects, with Special Emphasis on In-Court Compromise, 20 Law in Japan
74, 75 (1987). In-court compromise and conciliation have res judicata effect if properly recorded. Id.
Although both family and civil conciliation exist in Japan, this Comment is concerned only with
civil conciliation. Although Japanese conciliation might sound similar to a pre. trial conference under
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judicial attempt to enhance authority in a system providing limited
enforcement powers." Whatever the ultimate reason for the extensive use
of conciliation, few cases in Japan actually result in a final judgment,32
particularly in the patent infringement area.33
Although damages awards in Japan may be few in number, they
determine the price an infringer must pay. The amount of damages
ultimately available if a case is pursued to final judgment should set the
highest monetary value (or range of values) recoverable for infringement.
Therefore, court-mediated conciliation and private settlements probably
result in settlements that reflect the award ultimately available through
judgment, discounted by the cost of time and litigation necessary to reach
an ultimate judgment and by a risk factor that accounts for the possibility
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, the Japanese court's role is typically much more pervasive and influential. See id.;
Dan Fenno Henderson, Conciliation and Japanese Law: Tokugawa and Modern (1965) (describing
the process as "didactic conciliation").
31. See Haley, supra note 18, at 193 (noting that when power is separated from authority and the
state lacks adequate means of coercion, the state's ability to control individuals depends on its ability
to "persuade, bargain, or cajole in order to induce consent); see also Obuchi, supra note 30, at 87
(noting that enforcement usually is easier if a dispute is resolved through settlement rather than
judgment).
32. In 1980, of 205,503 civil suits filed 147,764 (72%) ended in court conciliation. Yahusei
Taniguchi & Yoshikazu Sagami, Civil Litigation, in 7 Doing Business in Japan pt. 14, § 10.0 1[2]
(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1994). Note however that an extremely high percentage of cases in U.S.
courts also settle. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 405 (1982) (noting that
85-90% of all civil cases filed in U.S. federal district courts settle before going to trial). However,
lawsuits are filed with much greater frequency in the United States than in Japan, resulting in a
greater absolute number of decisions. See infra note 33.
Debate over the reason for Japanese individuals' apparent aversion to litigation is long and
complex. For arguments stressing the cultural dislike of confrontation and preference for harmony,
see Ohta & Hozumi, Compromise in the Course ofLitigatlon, 6 Law in Japan 97 (1973); Lindgren &
Yudell, supra note 4, at 24-25. For contrary views suggesting that Japanese settle their disputes not
out of a desire to preserve cultural harmony but for other reasons, see John 0. Haley, The Myth of the
Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. Japanese Stud. 359 (1978) (suggesting that the availability of informal
dispute resolution mechanisms and structural factors inhibiting the courts' ability to provide
adequate relief may account for the low litigation rates in Japan); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru
Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. Legal Stud.
267 (1989) (suggesting that a high percentage of Japanese disputes may be settled because it may be
relatively easy to accurately predict how courts will resolve those disputes).
33. See Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 25 n.75 (noting that "[o]f the 369 patent infringement
cases filed in the District Court in 1990, 60 [16%] were withdrawn, 125 [34%] reached judgment,
and 157 [43%] were settled" (citing Japanese Patent Practice: Prosecution/Litigation, AIPLA Proc.
K18 (June 1992))). In the United States, the volume of patent lawsuits is greater, averaging 1253
annually from 1988 to 1992 and rising to 1474 in 1992. AIG Offers New Patent-Infringement
Liability Insurance, J. Proprietary Rights, July 1994, at 30.
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that a case, even if prosecuted to judgment, might be lost 34 Because
Japanese judges strongly influence settlement terms and are well aware
of the value of a potential damages award, the value of a settlement
reached through formal court-mediated conciliation will closely reflect
the damages award that would be granted by the court.35 In addition, to
the extent that private parties are aware of the size of monetary awards,36
any purely private settlement that occurs also should reflect this value.
Thus, the fact that conciliation plays a large role in Japanese conflict
resolution does not reduce the importance of damages awards in setting
the basic value of infringement. Although only a small :number of patent
infringement cases result in a final judgment and the recovery of a
damages award, the awards that exist will form a basis for determining
the value of patent infringement. Ultimately, the value of cases settled
through the formal conciliation process as well as those settled through
private dispute resolution are likely to reflect closely the value available
in a damages award.
34. See Haley, supra note 18, at 117. One might hypothesize that patent holders in Japan should
receive less from infringement than patent holders in the United States merely because conflict
resolution tends to occur sooner in the conflict process in Japan and therefore should be discounted
more steeply. However, this simple model is complicated because litigation costs in the two
countries may differ in absolute terms and also over time. Costs incurred early in the litigation
process are probably higher in Japan than in the United States, and costs incirred later in the process
may differ as well. See Forstner, supra note 29, at 14.
35. See Wachter, supra note 26, at 80-81. In an effort to promote settlement, the judiciary may
apply pressure to settle at below-market royalty rates. Forstner, supra note '9, at 14. The judiciary
exclusively determines the amount of damages because the jury system has nct been used in any case
in Japan since 1943. Noda, supra note 15, at 137-38.
36. Indeed, assuming a rational litigant model, the more accurate and reliable the information
available regarding the ultimate judgment value of a dispute, the more likely the disputants will settle
early in the process. Thus, it should not be surprising that settlement occu-s more frequently and
earlier in Japan than in the United States. See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 32. Since 1868,
Japan has had a national system of law, rather than the federalist system existing in the United
States, and has not used a jury system in civil litigation. Upon completion of legal training, judges
enter the judiciary, where they typically spend their entire careers. Throughout their careers, judges
are rotated throughout the country and attend various national training sessions. J. Mark Ramseyer &
Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (1993). The remit is a system which
should produce similar damages awards in similar situations nationwide. On the other hand, the
United States has a federalist system and an appointed judiciary consisting of individuals from
varying areas of legal practice, and relies heavily on jury decisions. This system can be expected to
produce inconsistent damages awards in different locations, even if the facts surrounding a legal
dispute are identical. For an empirical study evaluating results in the Japanese legal system, see
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 32.
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II. DIFFICULTIES OF PROOF IN JAPAN
Procedural restrictions on gathering and presenting evidence create
difficulties for a plaintiff trying to prove damages in Japan. The
discovery rules make it difficult for a plaintiff to gather evidence from
adversarial parties. In addition, the role of expert witnesses is
substantially limited in the Japanese system. These barriers to proof are
discussed in more detail below.
A. Limited Discovery Makes Proof of Damages Difficult in Japan
The lack of pretrial discovery and limited discovery during trial make
proof of damages extremely difficult in Japan. Standard legal practice
requires a plaintiff to satisfactorily prove the amount of damages that he
or she is seeking to recover. In Japan, a plaintiff must specify the exact
amount of the damages sought at the time a complaint is filed.37 The
plaintiff may amend the amount of damages after filing the complaint,
but the basis for the original estimate must be explained and evidence
sufficient to prove the estimate must be prepared and filed at the outset.38
Obtaining this initial evidence is likely to be difficult. Damage in a
patent infringement case often involves the plaintiff's loss of profits as
the result of sales by the infringer. Therefore, the plaintiff may need to
state the quantity of sales made by the defendant,39 which can be used to
estimate the value of profits lost by the plaintiff. The infiinger's books
and records usually will contain the best evidence for proving the volume
of the infringer's sales. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, these records most
likely will not be discoverable in Japan because plaintiffs generally are
not allowed to gather evidence from the defendant at the pretrial stage.4"
Thus, the plaintiff will have to look elsewhere for satisfactory evidence
to prove the amount of damages. This limitation makes a damages award
difficult to pursue.
37. Forstner, supra note 29, at 16; Eugene Lee & Yutaka Kubota, Remedies for Breach of License
Agreements, in Patent and Know-How Licensing in Japan and the United States 225, 254 (Teruo
Doi & Warren L. Shattuck eds., 1977) (citing H. Kaneko, Minji Sosh01 Taikei (System of the Code
of Civil Procedure) 170 (1956)). In the United States, on the other hand, a plaintiff need only plead
"an accounting for damages" without providing an exact monetary amount. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 &
Form 16.
38. Lee & Kubota, supra note 37, at 254.
39. Id. at 254n.160.
40. Harada, supra note 22, at 34.
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Assuming initial evidence can be gathered and the suit goes forward,
the amount of damages must be proved during the course of the trial to
the satisfaction of the court. Proof of damages is integral to proof of the
entire case in Japan, where the court cannot bifurcate the trial, render
judgment, and leave the amount of damages open for later determination
by a master.4 Although the Japanese trial is supposed 10 function as the
main forum for obtaining information in a lawsuit,42 in practice,
discovery laws offer little practical assistance to a plaintiff trying to
gather evidence to prove damages.
Japanese law provides that upon the request and showing of sufficient
necessity by either party, the court may order the other party to produce
documents necessary for the assessment of damages.43 If the defendant
does not comply with an order for the production of documents, the court
may "deem the assertion of the other party relating to the document to be
true." While this presumption theoretically provides significant
incentive for a party to produce documents, the reality is somewhat
different. The judicial presumption may not be imposed if the court has
not ordered the production of documents, and the court will not order the
production of documents when the person refusing a document request
has a "legitimate reason" for such refusal.45 The protection of trade
secrets is considered legitimate, and Japanese courts often are reluctant to
order the production of a defendant's books for fear that unrelated trade
secrets may be disclosed." Furthermore, civil courts are unlikely to
pursue a defendant's perjury or forgery, resulting in little assurance that
41. Lee & Kubota, supra note 37, at 254 n.158. Although bifurcation of liability and damages is
possible in the United States, the trend appears to be to not bifurcate. WMrold E. Wurst & Anne
Wang, The Law of Patent Damages, in Patent Litigation 1993, at 8 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 376, 1993).
42. Harada, supra note 22, at 39.
43. Pat. L. § 105 (Japan); see also Sadanao Arnemiya & Klkuo Nishimoto, Patents and Utility
Models, in 4 Doing Business in Japan pt. 6, § 2.17[3][b][v] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1994).
44. C. Civ. P. art. 316 (Japan). The court is limited to sanctioning a non-compliant third-party
with a maximum non-penal fine of 100,000 yen (approximately $1000). C. Civ. P. art. 318 (Japan).
For discussion concerning the lack of contempt power in Japan, see supra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
45. Pat. L. § 105 (Japan).
46. Lee & Kubota, supra note 37, at 254. If a plaintiff is unable to present records of the
defendant's production costs, it may be necessary to disclose one's own production costs and sales
expenses in order to prove lost profits. Id- at 254-55. In such a situation, some plaintiffs will prefer
to withdraw the suit rather than disclose such information. Id.
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any documents produced are actually original, true, and accurate
records. 47
B. Limited Use of Expert Witnesses in Japan
While the use of expert witnesses is central to proof of damages in the
United States,48 their use is more limited in Japan. Expert witnesses are
used to prove technical aspects of patent infringement,49 but the extent to
which they have been or can be used to prove damages caused by
infringement is uncertain. Yet, without the use of experts, plaintiffs often
will find it difficult to adequately prove the amount of damages.
In the United States, the use of experts is crucial for a plaintiff trying
to prove the amount of damages suffered as the result of infringement. °
Areas in which expert opinion is widely used include interpretation of
the plaintiff's own financial records, computation of incremental profit,
and the rate of royalty generally charged in an industry.5 Indeed, the use
of experts for proving damages in the United States has become almost
indispensable.52
In Japan, on the other hand, although the use of expert witnesses is
allowed,53 their role in helping to prove damages is not well defined.'
Expert witnesses are supposed to assist the judge by providing special
knowledge or giving an expert opinion." In Japan, the judge selects the
experts based on their experience and knowledge, and a party may not
present the testimony of its own expert witness." In patent infringement
47. Id. at 254. Abuse of discovery in patent litigation may also be common in the United States.
See Keith V. Rockey, Overview of a Patent Suit-The Decision To File, in Patent Litigation 1994, at
9, 36 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 396,
1994).
48. See Wurst & Wang, supra note 41, at 25 (stating that "it is difficult to contemplate presenting
a damage case to a court without the assistance of an expert witness").
49. See Wachter, supra note 26, at 77-78; Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 26.
50. See Wurst & Wang, supra note 41, at 25.
51. Ia
52. Id.
53. C. Civ. P. arts. 301-10 (Japan).
54. Japan's patent law makes no direct reference to the use of experts, other than to incorporate
the general rules on the use of expert witnesses contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Pat. L.
§ 151 (Japan). In contrast, U.S. patent law expressly provides for the use of experts to determine
damages. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
55. Takaaki Hattori & Dan Fenno Henderson, Civil Procedure in Japan § 7.05[9] (1985).
56. Forstner, supra note 29, at 13 (citing C. Civ. Pro. art. 304 (Japan)).
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litigation, the assistance of experts can be useful for the conduct of
technical experiments.57 Experts' written statements summarizing their
conclusions also may be submitted to the court for consideration. 8 In
determining technical aspects of patent infringement, such evidence may
be persuasive when appropriately used. 9
Whether similar forms of expert statements could be used to prove
damages in Japan is unpredictable. Given the prevalent use of experts in
the United States to prove damages in patent infringement suits, it is
crucial to clarify this situation. An American patent holder seeking to
enforce a patent in Japan should bear in mind that the testimony of one's
own expert cannot be introduced in Japan, and the use of written
statements may differ significantly, particularly with regard to
establishing damages. Thus, this issue should be carefrlly explored with
local Japanese counsel before pursuing an infringement action for
damages.
I. MONETARY DAMAGES IN JAPAN: DIFFICULTIES
PROVING CAUSATION AND NO POSSIBILITY OF
INCREASED DAMAGES
Besides the standard difficulties of proof discussed above, obtaining a
damages award requires clearing additional hurdles. More significantly,
establishing causation in a damages action can present severe difficulties
for the patent plaintiff. Part A below provides a brief introduction to the
two basic forms of infringement damages: lost profils and reasonable
royalty. Part B describes the strict requirements for recovery of lost
profits in Japan. Part C describes the requirements for the recovery of
reasonable royalty in Japan. Finally, part D examines the lack of
increased damages in Japan and the functional result of reasonable
royalty capping recovery in Japan.
57. Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 26.
58. Id. In addition, if prior to trial a retained expert fails to provide a satsfactory opinion, due to
the lack of discovery there is little risk that the opinion will be obtained by the defendant. Wachter,
supra note 26, at 78.
59. Wachter, supra note 26, at 77.
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A. A Brief Introduction to Lost Profits and Reasonable Royalty
In both the United States and Japan, two types of monetary damages
generally are available: lost profits and reasonable royalty.' ° Both
remedies are designed to make the patent owner whole for the losses
caused by infringement," but each is theoretically applicable to a slightly
different situation. In addition, as is discussed in more detail in parts B
and C below, the evidentiary requirements also differ dramatically.
Courts award lost profits when competition by the infringer results in
a decrease in the sales volume or price of the plaintiff's patented product.
Under standard economic theory, the reduction in sales volume or price
results in a corresponding loss of profits. Generally, lost profits provide
the most complete measure of recovery, theoretically accounting for all
profits the plaintiff loses as a result of the infringement.62 Thus, patent
holders typically prefer lost profits when available.63
On the other hand, reasonable royalty is in essence a best estimate
adopted by the court, usually awarded when a plaintiff has failed for one
reason or another to prove lost profits.' Often a patent holder will
choose to exploit a patent through licensing rather than through direct
production of the patented product. In this case, an amount equal to the
fee that the plaintiff would have charged the defendant to work the patent
60. A third measure of damages, established royalty, also may be recovered in the United States.
See Chisum, supra note 28, § 20.03[2] (defining established royalty as "the royalty rate established
by prior actual licenses for acts comparable to those engaged in by the infringer without authority").
While in certain circumstances it may be proper to consider established royalty as a distinct category
of damages award, for the purposes of this Comment established royalty will be incorporated into
the reasonable royalty concept.
61. Chisum, supra note 28, § 20.03, at 20-77; Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964); see also General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55
(1983).
62. However, monetary damages themselves sometimes may fail to provide complete
compensation for the harm caused by infringement. For a description of inadequacies of damages for
unquantifiable competitive advantages in the trade secret area, see Holly Emrick Svetz, Note,
Japan's New Trade Secret Law: We Asked For It-Now What Have We Got?, 26 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l
L. & Econ. 413, 430 (1992) (listing "advantages such as control over the direction and marketing of
a new technology;... the right to be the first to market; a reputation for innovation; customer loyalty
and the respect of peers; and the absence of any need to be entangled in continuous litigation").
63. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1484, (D. Mass. 1990), amended
by 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711 (D. Mass. 1991); Yoshiyuki Tamura, Chiteki zaisan ken to songai baisho
(Intellectual Property and Monetary Damages) 257 (1993); see also Wurst & Wang, supra note 41,
at 12.
64. Wurst & Wang, supra note 41, at 20 (citing Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d
1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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is considered appropriate compensation for infiingement." In the United
States, if a patent holder actually has licensed the patent to others, the
fees charged may be used as a basis for establishing the royalty that
theoretically would have been charged to the defendant.' If, however,
the plaintiff cannot establish the license value of the patent due to
evidentiary or other reasons, reasonable royalty is the appropriate
measure of recovery. 7 In this case, the court must provide a best estimate
of what the theoretical fee for the license would have been.6 ' Reasonable
royalty therefore generally provides a fall-back measure of damages for
the plaintiff who cannot show the extent of lost profits.
B. The Recovery ofLost Profits in Japan: Civil Code Article 709
Although patent holders prefer lost profits as the measure of damages,
they are difficult to recover in Japan. Judicial interpretations of the
damages provisions of the patent law have imposed strict requirements
on plaintiffs trying to prove lost profits. In particular, court
interpretations of causation have greatly limited the conditions under
which a plaintiff can establish lost profits. The result is that in most
situations a plaintiff must be content with recovering a reasonable royalty
rather than the more desirable lost profits.
Although the language of Japan's patent law specifically provides for
the recovery of a reasonable royalty,69 the statutory basis for recovery of
65. Chisum, supra note 28, § 20.03, at 20-78.
66. See id. § 20.03[3], at 20-159. However, recovery of royalty payments that theoretically would
have been charged does not compensate the plaintiff for the benefits that might have been obtained
by preventing the defendant from working the patent. See supra note 62.
67. Chisum, supra note 28, § 20.03[3], at 20-159. The concept of reasonible royalty is similar in
Japan. See Tamura, supra note 63, at 23.
68. However, the estimate must be based on evidence in the record. Chisum, supra note 28,
§ 20.03[3], at 20-160.
69. Pat. L. § 102(2) (Japan). The complete text is as follows: "A patentee or exclusive licensee
may claim, from a person who has intentionally or negligently infringed the patent right or exclusive
license, an amount of money which he would normally be entitled to receive for the working of the
patented invention, as the amount of damage suffered by him." lId
The patent law also explicitly provides for recovery of the infringeT's profits, basically a
measurement variation of the other two forms of damages. Pat. L. § 102(1) (Japan). The complete
text is as follows:
Where a patentee or exclusive licensee claims, from a person who has intentionally or
negligently infringed the patent right or exclusive license, compensation for damage caused to
him by the infringement, the profits gained by the infringer through the infringement shall be
presumed to be the amount of damage suffered by the patentee or exclusive licensee.
846
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lost profits is found outside the patent law in Civil Code article 709.70
Patent Law section 102(3) provides that "[tihe preceding subsection
[referring to reasonable royalty] shall not preclude a claim to damages
exceeding the amount referred to therein."" Civil Code article 709, a
general damages provision that provides for compensation for an
unlawful act and serves as the foundation for Japan's "tort" law,72
contains specific statutory language authorizing a claim for lost profits.
Article 709 states that "[a] person who violates intentionally or
negligently the right of another is bound to make compensation for
damage arising therefrom."73 Courts interpret the combined language of
Patent Law section 102(3) and Civil Code article 709 to allow a patent
holder to pursue a claim for the recovery of lost profits.74
The primary theory for the recovery of lost profits in Japan is that
infringing products result in increased supply, thereby driving down the
price the patent holder can command for a product and resulting in lost
profits for the patent holder.75 Although it also might be inferred that
infringing products of poor quality lower the market value of a patent
holder's products, there have been few cases in Japan awarding damages
Id.
In comparison, the current U.S. rule is that "[w]hile the inflinger's profits may be considered as
evidence tending to establish what constitutes a reasonable royalty or the amount of damages, they
may not be recovered as such" Chisum, supra note 28, § 20.02[4], at 20-63 to 20-64. For discussion
of recovery of the infringer's profits in Japan, see infra part 11.C.
70. Civil Code [Civ. C.] art. 709 (Japan), translated in 2 EHS Law Bulletin Series
(Bibun-Horei-Sha [Codes Translation Institute] ed., 1992). In the United States, lost profits are
recoverable based on a relatively straightforward interpretation of statutory patent law. The language
of the U.S. patent law specifically provides for the recovery of"damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). U.S. courts interpret this language to allow for the
recovery of lost profits. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1853) (interpreting the
Patent Act of 1836); see also Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320,
1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (interpreting current patent act).
71. Pat. L. § 102(3) (Japan).
72. Because Japan is a civil law country, "tort" liability technically is classified as a "private
delict." For a brief summary of the distinctions between "tort" and "delict," see Black's Law
Dictionary 427 (6th ed. 1990). For an overview of Japanese tort law, see Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law
207-31 (1992).
73. Civ. C. art. 709 (Japan). In Japan, there is a statutory presumption that any infringement is
negligently committed. Pat. L. § 103 (Japan).
74. Tamura, supra note 63, at 1-6.
75. Id. at 1-2 (citing (Tobacco Roller), 567 Hanrei Times 329, (Okayama Dist. Ct., May 29,
1985)).
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based on such a claim.76 Thus, a plaintiff's primary cause of action lies in
demonstrating that the infringer's illicit activity caused a decrease in the
sales price as well as the sales volume of the patented article.
The evidentiary burden of demonstrating damages can be severe, as
discussed above.77 However, in addition to procedural difficulties, the
patent plaintiff also faces a court that tends to take an "all or nothing"
approach to lost profits." Japanese courts essentially have held that in
order to recognize lost profits, all products sold by the defendant must
eliminate a corresponding potential sale by the plaintiff.79 Lacking this
clear-cut one-to-one correspondence, Japanese courts have been reluctant
to grant any lost profits damages to a plaintiff patent holder.80
Few situations permit the demonstration of a one-to-one
correspondence. Cases where lost profits have been recovered involve
the situation where evidence of a customer's decision to purchase the
infringer's product instead of the plaintiff's can be discovered and
76. Id. (but noting an exception in (Hairbrush case), 16(3) Mutai Shu 803 (Osaka Dist. CL, Dec.
20, 1976)).
Note, however, that specific statutory protection is provided for recovery of business reputation,
which might be applicable in this area. The relevant provision provides the following:
Upon the request of a patentee or exclusive licensee, the court may, in lieu of damages or in
addition thereto, order a person who has injured the business reputation of the patentee or
exclusive licensee by infringing the patent right or exclusive license, whevaer intentionally or
negligently, to take the measures necessary for the recovery of the business raputation.
Pat. L. § 106 (Japan). Another form of remedy would be to order the defendant to make a public
apology. Although apology is taken seriously in Japan and court-ordered apology could be a
significant form of remedy (see generally, Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of
Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 Law & S3c'y Rev. 461 (1986)),
Japanese courts have been reluctant to order public apologies. See Digest of Japanese Court
Decisions in Patentability and Patent Infringement Cases 1966-1968, at 80 (Yukuzo Yamasaki ed.
& trans., 1970) [hereinafter Digest 1966-1968] (editor commenting on Japaaese practices).
77. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
78. Tamura, supra note 63, at 2, 5.
79. Id. at 5; see also Tsugami Seisakusho KK. v. Taiyo Seiki Seisakuaho K.K. (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,
Aug. 31, 1965), translated in Digest of Japanese Court Decisions ir Patentability and Patent
Infringement Cases 1964-1965, at 82 (American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, ed., 1968)
[hereinafter Digest 1964-1965] (denying damages although defendant sold at least 18 infringing
products because plaintiff could not prove that it would have sold the 3iame number of products in
absence of infringement).
In contrast, it is not necessary for a U.S. plaintiff to show that it culd have made every single
infringing sale. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 60 (1992); Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1143-
44 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
80. Tamura, supra note 63, at 5; see also Tsugami Seisakusho K.K., translated in Digest 1964-
1965, supra note 79, at 82.
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introduced.8 Courts also have awared lost profits where the plaintiff's
and defendant's products were the only two comparable products in the
marketplace (i.e., a two-supplier market).82 However, if the infringer's
product is less expensive than the plaintiffs, particularly if the
infringer's product is of superior quality, or if the plaintiff entered the
relevant geographic market after the defendant, the court is unlikely to
find causation and will deny the recovery of lost profits.83
The result is that lost profits rarely will be recoverable. A customer's
frame of mind usually is not discoverable. Furthermore, the plaintiff and
infringer seldom are the only two competitors in the marketplace and
non-infringing alternative products frequently will exist.84 Finally, if the
patent holder is not actually using the patent commercially in Japan, lost
profits will not be available." Thus, without even considering the
procedural difficulties involved in gathering and presenting proof, few
plaintiffs will be able to meet the proof of causation standard required for
recovery of lost profits.
Although the recovery of lost profits theoretically is possible under
Japanese law, the difficulty of demonstrating a one-to-one
correspondence in sales lost to the infringer's illicit activity makes lost
profits difficult to obtain. 6 In actual practice, damages for patent
81. Tamura, supra note 63, at 5.
82. See id. at 3-4; see also Syntron Co. & Shinko Denki KK. v. Nitto Denki Seisakusho, Ltd.,
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Sept. 14, 1963), translated in Digest of Japanese Court Decisions in Patent
Infringement Cases 1955-1963, at 90 (American Chamber of Commerce in Japan ed., 1965)
[hereinafter Digest 1955-1963] (infringer's product provided only possible replacement in market).
In contrast, in the United States, courts recently have recognized lost profits based on market share
in a multiple-supplier market. See Wurst & Wang, supra note 41, at 17 (citing State Indus., Inc. v.
Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990), as the first
case in which a court of appeals recognized lost profits based on market share).
83. See Tamura, supra note 63, at 4; Syntron Co. & Shinko Denki K.K., translated in Digest
1955-1963, supra note 82, at 90 (causation found where plaintiff's product higher in price but
significantly better in quality). In the United States, if the infringer's price was significantly lower
than the patent holder's, evidence of causation has been found insufficient. Chisum, supra note 28,
§ 20.03[l][b][v][F].
84. If the plaintiff's patent coverage is broad enough, the possibility of non-infringing alternatives
may be eliminated. However, in a patent system with narrow patent claims interpretation, like
Japan's, the likelihood of eliminating all non-infringing alternatives with a single patent is small. See
Linck & McGarry, supra note 3, at 420-21 (discussing Japanese courts' narrow interpretation of
patent claims).
85. Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 30.
86. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing difficulty of discovery in Japan). But see
Syntron Co. & Shinko Denki K.., translated in Digest 1955-1963, supra note 82, at 90 (dealing
with rare case where infringer's product provided only possible replacement in market); Nihon
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infringement in Japan are based more successfully on the specific
damages provisions provided in Patent Law sections 102(1) and 102(2).87
The result is a decrease in the likelihood that litigation will be worth
pursuing. If lost profits are unavailable, some patent holders may find
that it is not worthwhile to go to trial to enforce their rights. 8
C. Presumed Damages: Patent Law Section 102
Japan's patent law specifically provides for two presumed
measurements for damages in a patent infringement lawsuit: reasonable
royalty89 and the profits gained by the infringer through the
infringement."° Because recovery under these two statutes does not
require meeting the arduous lost-profits standard of proof, they are the
more common forms of recovery.9' The amount of damages typically
awarded under either of these provisions, however, often is less than the
actual harm done to the plaintiff.
Proof of reasonable royalty requires the plaintiff to establish what "he
would normally be entitled to receive for the working of the patented
invention."'92 Presumably, satisfactory proof can be established by using
the plaintiff's own records, thus avoiding the problems of a weak
Kentestu KK. v. Kawakami Boeki KK (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 9, 1967), translated in Digest 1966-
1968, supra note 76, at 97 (court eliminated possibility of purchasing patented product from abroad
or from other manufacturers and determinel that purchaser of infringing product could purchase
only from patent holder or defendant).
In contrast, lost profits frequently are awarded in the United States. See Nancy J. Linck & Barry P.
Golob, Patent Damages: The Basics, 34 J.L. & Tech. 13, 14-19 (1993); Donald S. Chisum, 1993
Patent Law Digest §§ 6100-6210 (1993).
87. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 66.
88. Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 30.
89. Pat. L. § 102(2) (Japan). For the text of § 102(2), see supra note 69.
90. Pat. L. § 102(1) (Japan). For the text of § 102(1), see supra note 69.
In the United States both of these forms of damages are structurally provicded for under reasonable
royalty. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). The result is similar to that in Japan. Prior to 1946, U.S. law
explicitly recognized an accounting of the infiinger's illicit profits as a fourth category of monetary
damages. See 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1940); Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (deleting reference
to infringer profits). Current U.S. law provides that the infringer's profits mtrely constitute evidence
of a reasonable royalty. See supra note 69.
91. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 66 (stating that "in practice, damages awarded in Japan are
usually based on a reasonable royalty because of the difficulty in determining lost profits without
using discovery procedures").
92. Pat. L. § 102(2) (Japan).
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discovery system discussed above.93 However, reasonable royalty is only
a best estimate of what a plaintiff would have charged to license the
defendant to work the patent if a license had in fact been granted.
Because a licensee who works a patent will desire some amount of
personal profit, the license fee charged by the plaintiff inevitably will be
less than the amount of profit potentially obtainable had the patent holder
exclusively worked the license.94
In the case of infringement, however, patent holder P evidenced no
desire to license the patent to infringer D. If P had licensed the patent to
D, infringement would not have occurred. One of the primary reasons
why P may have chosen not to license the patent to D may be a desire on
the part of P to retain the entire potential profit and not settle for the
reduced amount. Thus, theoretically the patent holder should be entitled
to lost profits caused by D's infringement. However, in Japan, stripped
of the practical ability to recover lost profits, the patent holder is forced
to settle for the reduced profit that a reasonable royalty award represents.
Recovering the infringer's profits may be even more troublesome for
the plaintiff. To recover, the plaintiff must prove the amount of "the
profits gained by the infringer through the infringement."95 Proving the
amount of the defendant's profits usually involves gaining access to the
defendant's records, subjecting the plaintiff to all of the discovery
problems discussed above.96 Furthermore, even if those problems can be
overcome, the favorable presumption equating damages with the
infringer's profits will be worthless if the defendant has made little or no
profit.97 This situation is likely to be particularly relevant where the
93. See supra part 11. However, if information regarding profitability is considered confidential,
the plaintiff may choose to forego even this reduced remedy.
94. This result follows from the fact that the market will bear a certain price, X, for the patented
product. If patent holder, P, sells the product, it can be sold forX. If infringer, D, sells the product, it
also can be sold for X. However, D desires to make a profit and therefore will pay something less
than X for a license to manufacture the patented product If this something less is called Y and
assuming P's and D's manufacturing costs are the same, P must forfeit the amount X-Y if D is
granted a license. This illustrative model assumes that P's and D's manufacturing costs are equal
and that P is a rational actor seeking only to maximize profit. If P's manufacturing costs are more
than D's or if P does not wish to undertake manufacturing, then it may be profitable for both parties
to negotiate a license. Presumably this situation usually exists when a license actually is negotiated.
95. Pat. L. § 102(1) (Japan).
96. See supra part II.
97. See Pat. L. § 102(l) (Japan). But see KK Marushin v. Mitsuru Kobayashi (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,
Sept. 13, 1967), translated in Digest 1966-1968, supra note 76, at 76 (apparent anomaly where court
multiplied the plaintiff's rate of profit by the defendant's sales figure when the defendant claimed no
profits from sales of the infringing product).
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defendant is new to the market and forced to charge less than the plaintiff
would in order to acquire new customers. Thus, the plaintiff faces not
only severe evidentiary problems in trying to establish the defendant's
profits, but also, once again, the likelihood of recovering "profits"
substantially less than those actually lost.
D. Lack of Increased Damages in Japan and Reasonable Royalty as a
Ceiling on Recovery
The Japanese failure to provide for the possibility of increased
damages in patent infringement cases eliminates the possibility of
rectifying inequitable damages awards resulting from evidentiary or
other procedural barriers.98 Coupled with a situation in which lost profits
are hard to collect, the lack of increased damages creates a system where
reasonable royalty serves as a functional cap on recovery of damages.
This result stands in stark contrast to the United States, where reasonable
royalty serves as a floor, not a ceiling.99 Given these limitations, the
Japanese system provides limited financial disincentives to prevent
infringement. 1°°
In the United States, the ability to provide up to treble damages allows
a court to remedy inequities in damages awards created by evidentiary or
other procedural difficulties.' While increased damage;3 potentially may
result in overcompensation to the plaintiff, they also provide a court with
the ability to compensate plaintiffs for damages that cannot be proved or
98. Japanese patent law provides for the collection of actual damages only. Pat. L. §§ 102, 106
(Japan); Civ. C. arts. 709-724 (Japan). In the United States, increased damages are expressly
provided for by statute. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1938) (providing that in a successful patent infringement
action "the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed").
In general, Japan has not adopted policies allowing for multiple damages. For instance, although
Japanese antitrust laws were largely imported from the United States after 1945, Japan specifically
declined to adopt a provision allowing for the possibility of treble damages. In addition, Japanese
law does not allow for the recovery of punitive damages. See Norman T. Dlraslow, Recognition of
United States Punitive Damages Judgments in Japan: A Critical Historical .nalysis of the Origins,
Function and Public Policy Foundations of Punitive Damages 17-23 (1994) (unpublished LL.M.
thesis, University of Washington).
99. U.S. patent law explicitly provides that a successful patent plaintiff shall be awarded "in no
event less than a reasonable royalty." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). U.S. courts have expressly upheld this
standard. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(stating that "the purpose of this alternative is not to provide a simple accounting method, but to set a
floor below which the courts are not authorized to go").
100. However, other deterrents to infringement exist. See infra part V.
101. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988); Dobbs, supra note 9, § 3.12, at 359 & n. 18.
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are otherwise unrecognized by the law." The absence of increased
damages in Japan limits the judiciary's ability to remedy inequitable
results.
It is somewhat ironic that the Japanese Diet"03 has provided the courts
with some ability to decrease a damages award for equitable reasons'
but has not provided the courts with any ability to increase damages
awards.0 5 A truly equitable system would allow adjustments to be made
in both directions. By failing to allow courts to adjust damage award
upwards in deserving circumstances, Japanese patent law limits the
ability of courts to provide equitable remedies in some instances.
The absence of increased damages in Japan is likely to have other
negative enforcement effects as well, all but ensuring that reasonable
royalty will be the maximum damages recovered. Limiting damages to
less than the actual harm inflicted upon the plaintiff decreases the
disincentive for "taking" protected technology. If it is cheaper to risk a
lawsuit and the possibility of having to pay damages, which most likely
will be limited to a best estimate of a reasonable royalty, rather than to
lawfully license technology, Japanese competitors will have an incentive
to infringe patents."e Because in many cases reasonable royalty will
serve as the maximum recovery available, a damages award presumably
will cost no more than the price of a license, plus the cost of defending a
102. For a general discussion concerning multiple damages, see Dobbs, supra note 9, § 3.12.
103. The Diet is the national legislature of Japan.
104. Patent Law section 102(3) allows Japanese courts to reduce damages in the absence of
willfulness or gross negligence. The wording of the statute suggests that this potential reduction is
available only if the claim is for lost profits and not for reasonable royalty:
The preceding subsection [providing a statutory presumption of reasonable royalty] shall not
preclude a claim to damages exceeding the amount referred to therein. In such a case [i.e., a
claim for lost profits under Civil Code article 709], where there has been neither wilfulness nor
gross negligence on the part of the person who has infringed the patent right or the exclusive
license, the court may take this into consideration when awarding damages.
Pat. L. § 102(3) (Japan). For additional support for this conclusion, see Nihon Filing K.K. et al. v.
KYK Naito Seitetsujo (Book Shelf Case), 12 Kakyu Minshu 2808 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Nov. 20, 1961),
translated in part in Amemiya & Nishimoto, supra note 43, § 2.17[2], at VI 2-149; § 2.17(3], at VI
2-152 (providing that "[a]n amount of damages equal to a reasonable royalty is considered to be the
minimum damage sustained by the patent owner'); Intellectual Property Protection in Asia § 5.13, at
5-25 (Arthur Wineburg ed., 1994) ("The court cannot reduce damages below reasonable royalty even
if the court were to find the absence of both willfulness and gross negligence").
105. See supra note 98.
106. Note that there may be other effective forms of deterrence in Japan. See infra part V.
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lawsuit. Though this latter cost is by no means insubstantial in Japan, 7 it
can be minimized by reaching a prompt settlement.
IV. ADDITIONAL DISINCENTIVES TO LITIGATION: LACK OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND LITIGATION FILING FEES
A. No Attorneys'Fees in Japan
A further barrier to patent litigation is the unavailability of attorneys'
fees in a Japanese patent infringement action."' The general provisions
of the Civil Code concerning recovery of court costs are incorporated
into the patent law. 19 The rule in Japan is that "the losing party pays for
his own as well as his adversary's litigation expenses.""0  However,
attorneys' fees are not considered to be recoverable expenses."' If
attorneys' fees are not deductible, a plaintiff's true financial recovery is
the amount of the damages award less the cost of attorneys' fees." 2 As
previously stated, a damages award in Japan is likely to fail to fully
107. For a discussion of the costs of a lawsuit in Japan, see Wachter, supra note 26, at 68-70;
Forstner, supra note 29, at 13-15.
108. In the United States, attorneys' fees are available in "exceptional cases." 35 U.S.C. § 285
(1988). This language generally has been interpreted by the courts to mean willful or deliberate
infringement. Chisum, supra note 28, § 20.03[4][c], at 20-384 to -385. In addition, it appears that
since the creation of the Federal Circuit, attorneys' fees have been awarded with increasing
frequency in the United States. Brian D. Coggio et al., Damage Control-What an Adjudged
Infringer Can Do To Minimize the Resulting Damage, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 250, 262 (1987).
109. Pat. L. § 169 (Japan) (incorporating C. Civ. P. arts. 89-94, 98(l)- 2), 99, 101, 102, 121(1),
122(1), and 126(1)).
110. Hattori & Henderson, supra note 55, § 10.01, at 10-2 (citing C. Civ. P. art. 89). But see
Forstner, supra note 29, at 16 (noting a practicing Japanese patent attorney's opinion that "in
practice, where damages are awarded, plaintiffs seldom seek to recover costs").
111. Hattori & Henderson, supra note 55, § 10.01, at 10-2.
An argument has been made that attorneys' fees should be recoverable as damages based on the
Japanese Supreme Court's decision in Lin v. Uchiyama, 548 HanreiJiho 19 (Sup. Ct., P.B., Feb. 27,
1969) (holding attorneys' fees recoverable as damages in an action to recover property the defendant
wrongfully seized and auctioned based on an already invalidated mortgage registration). The basic
theory of the Court was that a person injured by a tortious act who must retain counsel and file a
lawsuit to protect his or her interest may recover attorneys' fees as part of the damages. Hattori &
Henderson, supra note 55, § 10.01, at 10-2 n.3. Based on this decision, t e possibility exists that
attorneys' fees are recoverable in patent cases. Lee & Kubota, supra note 37, at 253-54 n.156
(noting claims for attorneys' fees in other "tc-rt" cases, such as automobile injury cases and pollution
cases, and suggesting that plaintiffs' self-restraint may be the reason why attorneys' fees are not
currently included in patent infringement casm).
112. Even if damages actually are awarded, they still may be difficult to collect. However,
discussion of the Japanese law on the execution ofjudgments is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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compensate a plaintiff for patent infringement. When attorneys' fees are
subtracted, it will provide even less adequate consideration. Given the
limited nature of monetary recovery, it is not surprising that few patent
infringement cases result in final judgment. 13
B. Filing Fees
A final disincentive to bringing an infringement action in Japan is the
filing fee that must be paid upon initiation of a lawsuit. 14 The fee is
based on a percentage of the value of the dispute. The fee schedule is
roughly 0.5% at the trial court level, 0.75% for appeals to the high court,
and about 1.0% for appeals to the Japanese Supreme Court."5 These fees
are cumulative." 6 The dispute value usually equals the economic value
of stopping future infringement plus an amount of past damages." 7 As
discussed earlier, the amount of the damages claim must be specified at
the time the case is filed."' The amount of this claim will form the basis
for calculating the economic value of the suit, which in turn is used to
determine the court fee." 9 This official fee must be paid in advance. 2
Thus, a plaintiff in Japan must weigh the amount of damages claimed
against the chance of success and will normally want to have a
reasonable chance of success before filing a large claim.' Additional
claims for damages may be added at any time while the lawsuit is
pending, which in turn will require the payment of additional fees."
113. Indeed, one might begin to wonder why any patent claims reach final judgment. Presumably,
in certain cases the defendant is so intractable in negotiations that the plaintiff has little choice but to
proceed to final judgment. In other cases, the benefits of obtaining an injunction or the likelihood
that the value of damages less attorneys' fees still will exceed the defendant's settlement position
may lead a plaintiff to pursue a case to judgment
114. Note that there is no fee charged to the defendant.
115. Forstner, supra note 29, at 14.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
119. Forstner, supra note 29, at 14.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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V. ENFORCEMENT IN A SYSTEM WITH LIMITED DAMAGES
It is possible to successfully enforce a patent in Japart.' However, the
limited nature of equitable and monetary relief available through
litigation means that other methods of enforcement are vitally important.
A primary restraint on patent infringement in Japan is probably the
shame associated with violating a recognized rule of society. 24 The fact
that a law prohibiting infiingement exists legitimizes the idea that
infringement is wrong."z So long as members of Japanese society fear
the social costs of committing a wrongful act, patent owners have
significant protection against infringement.
126
However, protection based merely on other individuals' notions of
"wrong" may be tenuous. Acts committed against non-community
members may not carry the same social stigma as those committed
against community members. 27 Shame felt in response to actions of, or
against, non-community members may be entirely different than that felt
in response to actions of, or against, community members.' Patent
infringement warning letters often are respected out: of concern for
maintaining harmony or "saving face" in Japan. 2 9 However, if the patent
holder is not a full member of Japanese society, for instance if the patent
holder is a foreign corporation without a major presence in Japan, a
warning letter may lack value and may be dispensed with. 3 ° Thus,
American inventors or small concerns seeking to profit from patent rights
in Japan should be aware of the limitations of being a newcomer or a
123. See Wachter, supra note 26, at 85 ("[F]rom the perspective of an American attorney who has
experienced the challenge, I am convinced that a foreign-attorney can effectively manage and direct
successfiul Japanese patent enforcement litigation to effectively remedy viohtions, in practical terms
and at a cost which can be justifiable.'); Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 32 (stating that
Americans' "intellectual property can be effectively protected in Japan").
124. See generally John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989) (discussing the
regulating force of shame in all cultures and in Japan in particular); see also Lee & Kubota, supra
note 37, at 255 (stating that judgments in patent infringement cases have been voluntarily observed
and theorizing that this result probably occurs because defendants often are big companies who do
not wish to risk tarnishing their valuable reputations).
125. See Haley, supra note 18, at 6-7.
126. Indeed, the importance of this shame may be more important than the monetary sanction
(punishment) itself. See Braithwaite, supra note 124, at 59-61.
127. See Chic Nakane, Japanese Society 20-21 (1st paperback ed. 1972) (describing situations
resulting from a strong "them" and 'us" consciousness in Japan).
128. See Braithwaite, supra note 124, at 127-29.
129. See Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 26; Wachter, supra note 26, at 74.
130. Wachter, supra note 26, at 74.
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small player in the Japanese system. A system based on shame tends to
reflect the value of the insiders, protect their interests, and maintain the
status quo.
On the other hand, notions of acceptable behavior can change rapidly.
Typically, Japanese corporations have not sought to aggressively enforce
their patents. This failure to enforce their patents may be because of a
cultural predisposition to harmony, but it also may be because most
Japanese companies were playing "catch up" and had more incentive to
borrow new technology from others than to try to protect their own.
Thus, the community as a whole benefited from a weak patent
enforcement system. To the extent that Japanese corporations are
increasingly developing valuable technology and have a desire to protect
its misappropriation, there will be increased pressure to strengthen the
patent protection laws of Japan. There is evidence that the situation
might be moving in this direction. For example, currently Fujitsu and
Mitsubishi are taking an aggressive approach to enforcing their patents,
exhibiting a preference for full-blown litigation over negotiated
settlement.1
31
Although Japanese patent enforcement may work for Japanese
concerns, American owners of Japanese patents are likely to find the
system unsatisfactory for protecting their interests. Limited judicial relief
forces reliance on other methods of enforcement. However, these other
methods are highly cultural and may not adequately protect a foreigner's
interest, particularly a foreigner who has not fully entered the Japanese
system. The result is likely to be an increased number of Americans
dissatisfied with Japanese patent policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
An improved patent application system will help level the playing
field, but unfortunately American manufacturers may not be prepared to
play ball on the new field where they find themselves. As American
baseball players in Japan have found, though the game may resemble
what they knew in the United States, if they want to play ball
successfully, they have to play it the Japanese way. 3 1 Patent protection
will be no different.
131. Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 4, at 14.
132. See generally, Robert Whiting, The Chrysanthemum and the Bat: The Game Japanese Play
(1977); Robert Whiting, You Gotta Have Wa (1989).
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An improved application process hopefully will ease access for
foreigners and thereby reduce the number of complaiats regarding the
acquisition of patent rights in Japan. However, without addressing the
remedy side of the equation, the reforms themselves actually may lead to
an increase in the total number of complaints regarding the Japanese
patent system. Assuming a modified application process allows more
foreigners to obtain patents and enter into the Japanese system, future
problems will draw complaints from an increasing number of foreign
patent holders. Complaints will arise where problems are encountered,
and problems are likely to be encountered when foreigners try to enforce
their newly acquired Japanese patent rights. Thus, rather than
diminishing, American complaints about the Japanese patent system are
likely to increase, merely shifting from the application process to the
enforcement system. As an increasing number of American businesses
likely will soon find out, it is one thing to receive a patent in Japan; it is
quite another to enforce it.
